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Abstract: Leaking of confidential data to an unauthorized agent is a major concern for an organization. In this article we
seek to detect the trusted node that leaks the confidential data to an unauthorized agent. Traditionally, leakage of data is
handled by water marking technique which requires data modification. If the watermarked copy is found at some
unauthorized site then distributor can claim his ownership. But one of the issues with watermarking method is data
modification. To overcome the disadvantages of using watermark, data allocation strategies are used to improve the
probability of identifying guilty third parties. The idea is to distribute the data intelligently to agents based on sample data
request and explicit data request in order to improve the chance of detecting the guilty agents. Modern business activities
also rely on extensive email exchange. Email leakages have become widespread, and the severe damage caused by such
leakages constitutes a disturbing problem for organizations. Hence, filtering of E-mails is also necessary. This can be done
by blocking E-mails which contains images, videos or sensitive data and filtering the text file of an organization.
Keywords: Sensitive Data, Fake Objects, Data Allocation Strategies.

1. LEAKING AGENT DETECTION
distributor sees “enough evidence” that an agent
leaked data, he may stop doing business with him, or
may initiate legal proceedings.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the course of doing business, sometimes sensitive
data must be handed over to supposedly trusted third
parties. For example, personal information provided
to cellular companies may be used by other
companies for advertising. Similarly, a company may
have partnerships with other companies that require
sharing customer data. Another enterprise may
outsource its data processing, so data must be given
to various other companies. We call the owner of the
data the distributor and the supposedly trusted third
parties the agents. There may be the case that a
trusted agent may leak confidential data to an
unauthorized agent. Therefore, it becomes necessary
to identify the leaking agent in order to have a
successful working within an organization.

II. PROPOSED WORK
Our goal is to detect when the distributor’s sensitive
data has been leaked by agents, and if possible to
identify the agent that leaked the data. Perturbation is
a very useful technique where the data is modified
and made “less sensitive” before being handed to
agents. We develop unobtrusive techniques for
detecting leakage of a set of objects or record. In this
section we develop a model for assessing the “guilt”
of agents. We also present algorithms for distributing
objects to agents, in a way that improves our chances
of identifying a leaker. Finally, we also consider the
option of adding “fake” objects to the distributed set.
Such objects do not correspond to real entities but
appear realistic to the agents. If it turns out an agent
was given one or more fake objects that were leaked,
then the distributor can be more confident that agent
was guilty.

In the last years watermarking techniques have
emerged as an important building block which allow
the owner of the data to embed an imperceptible
watermark into the data e.g., a unique code is
embedded in each distributed copy. If that copy is
later discovered in the hands of an unauthorized
party, the leaker can be identified. Furthermore,
watermarks can sometimes be destroyed if the data
recipient is malicious. We study unobtrusive
techniques for detecting leakage of a set of objects or
records. Specifically, the following scenario: After
giving a set of objects to agents, the distributor
discovers some of those same objects in an
unauthorized place. (For example, the data may be
found on a website, or may be obtained through a
legal discovery process.) At this point, the distributor
can assess the likelihood that the leaked data came
from one or more agents, as opposed to having been
independently gathered by other means. If the

III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The distributor owns the sensitive data set T= {t1,
t2… tn}. The agent Ai request the data objects from
distributor. The objects in T could be of any type and
size, e.g. they could be tuples in a relation, or
relations in a database. The distributor gives the
subset of data to each agent. After giving objects to
agents, the distributor discovers that a set L of T has
leaked. This means some third party has been caught
in possession of L. The agent Ai receives a subset Ri
of objects T determined either by implicit request or
an explicit request.
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Let the distributor have data request from n agents.
The distributor wants to give tables R1 ,R2……..Rn
to agents A1 ,A2…………. An respectively, so that

 Implicit Request
Ri = Implicit (T, mi) : Any subset of mi records from
T can be given to agent Ai
 Explicit Request
Ri = Explicit (T, Condi) : Agent Ai receives all T
objects that satisfy Condition.




IV. DATA ALLOCATION PROBLEM

i.

A. FAKE OBJECTS
The distributor may be able to add fake objects to the
distributed data in order to improve his effectiveness
in detecting guilty agents. Our use of fake objects is
inspired by the use of “trace” records in mailing lists.
In this case, company A sells to company B a mailing
list to be used once (e.g., to send advertisements).
Company A adds trace records that contain addresses
owned by company A. Thus, each time company B
uses the purchased mailing list, A receives copies of
the mailing. These records are a type of fake objects
that help identify improper use of data. The
distributor creates and adds fake objects to the data
that he distributes to agents.

ii.

Distribution satisfies agent’s request; and
Maximizes the guilt probability differences
Δ (i, j) for all i, j= 1, 2, ……n and i≠j.
maximize(overR1….,Rn)(…,.Δ(i,j),…)
i≠j…(A)
minimize(overR1,….,Rn)(..,│Ri∩Rj│÷|Ri|
…) i≠j …….(B)

C. GUILTY AGENTS
Suppose that after giving objects to agents, the
distributor discovers that a set S _ T has leaked. This
means that some third party, called the target, has
been caught in possession of S. For example, this
target may be displaying S on its website, or perhaps
as part of a legal discovery process, the target turned
over S to the distributor. Since the agents U1; . . . ;
Un have some of the data, it is reasonable to suspect
them leaking the data. However, the agents can argue
that they are innocent, and that the S data were
obtained by the target through other means. For
example, say that one of the objects in S represents a
customer X. Perhaps X is also a customer of some
other company, and that company provided the data
to the target.

Depending upon the addition of fake tuples into the
agent’s request, data allocation problem is divided
into four cases as :
 Explicit request with fake tuples (EF)
 Explicit request without fake tuples (EF’)
 Implicit request with fake tuples (SF)
 Implicit request without fake tuples (SF’).

For the sake of simplicity our model relies on two
assumptions:
Assumption 1: For all t1, t2… tn Є L and t1≠ t2, the
provenance of t1is independent of t2
Assumption 2: Tuple tЄL can only be obtained by
third user in one of the two ways:
1. Single user A1 leaked t or
2. Third user guessed t with the help of other
resources.

Pr { Gj|S =Ri } or simply Pr {Gj |Ri } is the
probability that agent is guilty if the distributor
discovers a leaked table S that contains all objects.

Now to compute the guilt probability that he leaks a
single object t to L, we define a set of users. To find
the probability that an agent Ai is guilty for the given
set L, consider the target guessed t1 with probability
p and that agent leaks t1 to L with probability 1-p.
First compute the probability that he leaks a single
object to L. To compute this, define the set of agents
Ut = { Ai | tЄ Ri } that have t in their data sets. Then
using Assumption 2 and known probability p,we
have, Pr{Some agent leaked t to L=1-p--------------(1)
Assuming that all agents that belongs to Ut can leak t
to L with equal probability and using Assumption 2
we get,
Pr(Ai leaked t to L)={(1-p)÷U1) if Ai € U1-- ------(2)
Given that user Ai is guilty if he leaks at least one
value to L, with assumption 1 and equation 2, we can
compute the probability that user Pr{Gi| L} Ai is
guilty :

The difference functions Δ ( i, j ) is defined as:
Δ ( i, j ) = Pr {Gj |Ri } – Pr {Gj |Ri }

Pr {Gi| L=1- Π t € L∩Ri (1-((1-p)÷U1))} that user Ai
is guilty :------------------------------------------------(3)

Fig 1: Leakage Problem Instances

B. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The distributor’s data allocation to agents has one
constraint and one objective. The distributor’s
constraint is to satisfy agents’ requests, by providing
them with the number of objects they request or with
all available objects that satisfy their conditions. His
objective is to be able to detect an agent who leaks
any portion of his data. The objective is to maximize
the chances of detecting a guilty agent that leaks all
his data objects.
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9: Ri← Ri {f}
10: Fi← Fi {f}
11: bi←bi-1
12: if bi=0 then
13: R←R/{Ri}
14: B←B-1

D. DATA ALLOCATION STRATEGIES
In this section we describe allocation strategies that
solve exactly or approximately the scalar versions of
approximation equation. We resort to approximate
solutions in cases where it is inefficient to solve
accurately the optimization problem.


In lines 1-5, Algorithm 1 finds agents that are eligible
to receiving fake objects in O(n) time. Then, in the
main loop in lines 6-14, the algorithm creates one
fake object in every iteration and allocates it to
random agent. The main loop takes O(B) time.
Hence, the running time of the algorithm is O(n + B).
If
, the algorithm minimizes every term
of the objective summation by adding the maximum
number bi of fake objects to every set Ri, yielding the
optimal solution. Otherwise, if B
, the
algorithm just selects at random the agents that are
provided with fake objects. We return back to our
example and see how the objective would change if
the distributor adds fake object f to R2 instead of R1.
In this case, the sum-objective would be

EXPLICIT DATA REQUESTS

In problems of class EF, the distributor is not allowed
to add fake objects to the distributed data. So, the data
allocation is fully defined by the agents’ data
requests. Therefore, there is nothing to optimize.
Objective values are initialized by agents’ data
requests. Say, for example, that T={t1,t2} and there
are two agents with explicit data requests such that
R1={t1,t2} and R2={t1}. The value of the sum
objective is in this case :

The distributor cannot remove or alter the R1 or R2
data to decrease the overlap R1∩ R2. However, say
that the distributor can create one fake object (B =1)
and both agents can receive one fake object (b1 =b2
=1). In this case, the distributor can add one fake
object to either R1 or R2 to increase the
corresponding denominator of the summation term.
Assume that the distributor creates a fake object f and
he gives it to agent R1. Agent U1 has now R1=
{t1,t2,f} and F1 ={f} and the value of the sumobjective decreases to :

The reason why we got a greater improvement is that
the addition of a fake object to R2 has greater impact
on the corresponding summation terms, since

The left-hand side of the inequality corresponds to the
objective improvement after the addition of a fake
object to R1 and the right-hand side to R2.


If the distributor is able to create more fake objects,
he could further improve the objective. We present in
Algorithms 1 and 2 a strategy for randomly allocating
fake objects. Algorithm 1 is a general “driver” that
will be used by other strategies, while Algorithm 2
actually performs the random selection. We denote
the combination of Algorithm 1 with 2 as e-random.
We use e-random as our baseline in our comparisons
with other algorithms for explicit data requests.

SAMPLE DATA REQUESTS

With sample data requests, each agent Ui may receive
any T subset out of different object allocations. In
every allocation, the distributor can permute T objects
and keep the same chances of guilty agent detection.
The reason is that the guilt probability depends only
on which agents have received the leaked objects and
not on the identity of the leaked objects.
Algorithm 2: Implicit sample Data Request

Algorithm 1. Allocation for Explicit Data Requests
(EF)
Input: R1; . .;Rn, cond1; . . ; condn, b1; .. ; bn,
Output: R1; . . .;Rn, F1; . . . ; Fn
1: R←Ф (Agents that can receive fake objects)
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: if bi > 0 then
4: R←R {i}
5: Fi← Ф
6: while B> 0
7: i← SELECTAGENT(R,R1,….,Rn)
8: f← CREATEFAKEOBJECT(Ri,Fi,condi)

1: a← t // a[k]: number of agent who have received
object tk
2: R1←Ф,…,Rn ←Ф
3: remaining ←
4: while remaining > 0 do
5: for all i=1…,n : |Ri| < mi do
6: k
// May also use
additional parameters
7: Ri ←Ri {tk}
8: a[k]←a[k]+1
9: remaining← remaining -1
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V. METHODOLOGY

VI. CONCLUSION

We present the algorithm and the corresponding
results for the explicit data allocation with the
addition of fake tuples. Whenever any user request
for the tuple, it follows the following steps:
1. The request is sent by the user to the
distributor.
2. The request may be implicit or explicit.
3. If it is implicit a subset of the data is given.
4. If request is explicit, it is checked with the
log, if any previous request is same.
5. If request is same then system gives the data
objects that are not given to previous agent.
6. The fake objects are added to agent’s request
set.
7. Leaked data set L, obtained by distributor is
given as an input.
8. Calculate the guilt probability Gi of user. In
the case where we get similar guilt
probabilities of the agents, we consider the
trust value of agent. These trust values are
calculated from the historical behavior of
agents.

Data leakage is a silent type of threat. An employee
as an insider can intentionally or accidentally leak
sensitive information which can be electronically
distributed via e-mail, Web sites, FTP, instant
messaging, spreadsheets, databases, and any other
electronic means available – all without knowledge.
To assess the risk of distributing data two things are
important, where first one is data allocation strategy
that helps to distribute the tuples among customers
with minimum overlap and second one is calculating
guilt probability which is based on overlapping of his
data set with the leaked data set. Our model is
relatively simple, but we believe it captures the
essential trade-offs. The algorithms we have
presented implement data distribution strategies that
can improve the distributor’s chances of identifying a
leaker.
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2. Email-Filtering
Suspicious email detection is a kind of mailing
system where suspicious users are identified by
determining the keywords or URL used by him.
Mails containing keywords or important files are
blocked by the administrator so that they cannot be
forwarded. All these blocked mails are checked by
the administrator to identify the users who sent such
mails. The users of this system are composing mails
to the other users who are authenticated already.
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